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Like Feinberg and Sherman (1985) and Phillips and Mason (1992)
we test experimentally whether conglomerate ﬁrms, i.e., ﬁrms com-
peting on multiple structurally unrelated markets, can eﬀectively limit
competition. Our more general analysis assumes diﬀerentiated rather
than homogeneous products and distinguishes strategic substitutes as
well as complements to test this forbearance hypothesis. Rather than
only a partners design we also explore a random strangers design to
disentangle eﬀects of forbearance and repeated interaction. Surpris-
ingly, conglomerate ﬁrms do not limit competition, they rather foster
it. More in line with our expectations we ﬁnd more cooperation in
complement markets than in substitute markets and also more coop-
eration in a partners than in a strangers matching.
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Jena Economic Research Papers 2010 - 0431 Introduction
Typically, large ﬁrms do not only oﬀer many products, but sell them in many
distinct national and international markets. In contrast to modern large
ﬁrms, ﬁrms around the centuries were conglomerates operating in unrelated
markets and being confronted with conglomerate rivals in many unrelated
markets. This observation of multimarket contact by conglomerate ﬁrms led
economists to believe that multimarket contacts foster collusive behaviour
in markets where rivals meet. Corwin D. Edwards was among the ﬁrst who
pointed to the potential of anti-competitive market outcomes:
“There is an awareness that if competition against the large ri-
val goes so far as to be seriously troublesome, the logic of the
situation may call for conversion of the warfare into total war.
Hence there is an incentive to live and let live, to cultivate a co-
operative spirit, and to recognize priorities of interest in the hope
of reciprocal recognition. Those attitudes support such policies
as refraining from sale in a large company’s home market below
whatever price that company may have established there; refrain-
ing from entering into the production of a commodity which a
large company has developed; not contesting the patent claims
of a large company even when they are believed to be invalid;
abstaining from an eﬀort to win away the important customers
of a large rival; and sometimes refusing to accept such customers
even when they take the initiative.” (Edwards, 1955, p. 335).
Although conglomerates are much less frequent in the age of globalisation,
the concern that multimarket ﬁrms mutually forbear from competing even
in related markets remain. Despite the potential for mutual forbearance
among multiproduct ﬁrms, relatively little research has analysed the eﬀects
on competitive behaviour and market outcomes. Available evidence on the
mutual forbearance hypothesis comes from experimental, theoretical, and
empirical studies.
Our attempt to test the mutual forbearance hypothesis has been inspired
by theoretical and experimental studies. Theoretical work by Bernheim and
Whinston (1990) shows that asymmetries among multimarket ﬁrms and be-
tween market structures facilitate mutual forbearance. However, experimen-
tal studies lead to diﬀerent results. Feinberg and Sherman (1985) conducted
the ﬁrst experimental study by assuming that two ﬁrms compete in two ho-
mogeneous markets, with zero cross-elasticity of linear demand across mar-
kets, and linear productions costs in both ﬁrms which are unrelated across
1
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pothesis. In contrast, Phillips and Mason (1992) found strong support of the
propositions in Bernheim and Whinston (1990). However, the same authors
showed the opposite in an experiment conducted later (Phillips and Mason,
2001).
These experimens were motivated by the empirical study by Heggestad
and Rhoades (1978) who found that multimarket linkages among 187 major
U.S. banking markets deterred competition. Successive empirical studies
looked at the conditions under which multimarket contacts are weakened or
strengthened, but consistently show that multimarket contacts lead to mutual
forbearance. In particular, Evans and Kessides (1994) and Gimeno and Woo
(1996, 1999) detected that collusive pricing is associated with multimarket
contacts in the U.S. airline industry. Parker and R¨ oller (1997) and Busse
(2000) found collusive behaviour in the U.S. cellular telephone industry due to
interdependency. Fern´ andez and Mar´ ın (1998) showed eﬀects of multimarket
contracts on prices in the Spanish hotel industry and Jans and Rosenbaum
(1997) in the U.S. cement industry.
Furthermore, ﬁrms with multimarket contacts have higher proﬁts (Scott,
1982, 1991), higher survival rates (Baum and Korn, 1996, 1999), lower R&D
expenditures, fewer product introductions (Vonortas, 2000; Young et al.,
2000), lower sales growth (Greve, 2008), and lower service quality (Prince
and Simon, 2009).
Our experimental study tries to complement the theoretical and empir-
ical studies about mutual forbearance eﬀects. In contrast to Feinberg and
Sherman (1985) and in line with the theoretical work by Bernheim and Whin-
ston (1990) we derive the market equilibria as point predictions and analyse
statistically without any structural imposition how one can explain the ex-
perimental ﬁndings. In other words: Unlike Feinberg and Sherman (1985) we
clearly distinguish between the rational choice prediction and our behavioral
explanation of the empirical ﬁndings, e.g. by relying on the mutual forbear-
ance hypothesis. Our benchmark analysis predicts no forbearance eﬀects
since the two markets are structurally unrelated what Feinberg and Sher-
man (1985) deny by rendering the markets behaviourally interdependent via
conjectural variations across markets. Whereas they attribute forbearance
eﬀects to conjectural variations across markets, we will more openly explore
how the behaviour of one ﬁrm in one or both markets will aﬀect the other
ﬁrm’s behaviour.
Section 2 describes our more general market environment and section 3
the experimental design. Section 4 analyses the experimental data for the
various treatments. Section 5 concludes and compares our ﬁndings with those
of Feinberg and Sherman (1985) and others.
2
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Like Feinberg and Sherman (1985) and Phillips and Mason (1992), we capture
“conglomerates” by seller ﬁrms which are active on two markets and “com-
peting conglomerates”by duopolistic competition. Given this framework we,
however, generalise the analysis considerably by:
1. allowing for diﬀerentiated products which may be both, strategic sub-
stitutes and complements,
2. comparing three constellations of product types, namely
• both products on both markets are substitutes (the only case con-
sidered by Feinberg and Sherman (1985) and Phillips and Mason
(1992) who study sales competition on homogeneous markets),
• both products on both markets are complements,
• the two products on the one market are substitutes, those on the
other market are complements,
3. varying the“shadow of the future”by comparing a design where players
are rematched every four periods with one where they are rematched
every twelve periods, and
4. performing control experiments with one conglomerate ﬁrm competing
with
• diﬀerent conglomerate ﬁrms (Feinberg-and-Sherman’s other treat-
ment)
• diﬀerent non-conglomerate ﬁrms
• only single ﬁrms, no conglomerates
on the two markets.
The reason for 1 and 2 is that one often obtains qualitatively diﬀerent
results for strategic complements than for strategic substitutes (see, for in-
stance, Bester and G¨ uth, 1998). The reason for 3 is that only by varying
the interaction time (here from four to twelve), one can hope to disentangle
what is due to one-sided or mutual forbearance and what to future dealings.1
1Relying on a partners design only like Feinberg and Sherman (1985) or Phillips and
Mason (1992) appears realistic but invites all sorts of confounding eﬀects since repeated
interaction allows for reputation formation, punishment etc.
3
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case in 4, captures that conglomerates will usually be active on diﬀerent mar-
kets. We will employ a circle design with each ﬁrm selling on a left- and a
right-hand market where it competes with its left-, respectively right-hand
neighbour ﬁrm. By investigating the case of a unique conglomerate, we hope
to disentangle the eﬀect of “going conglomerate”, i.e., of whether one gains
from becoming active on more than one market and how this depends on the
“conglomeration”of one’s competitors.
In order not to overburden our participants we keep the market model
as simple as possible by relying on structural symmetry otherwise. For the
X-market the inverse demand functions are
pi = a − bxi + cxj with a,b > 0 and |c| < 2b
and for the Y -market
qi = α − βyi + γyj with α,β > 0 and |γ| < 2β
for both competing ﬁrms i = 1,2 with i  = j. Here xi,xj,yi,yj denote
the sales amounts and pi,pj,qi,qj the prices or unit proﬁts since we abstract
from production costs. Thus for i = 1,2 ﬁrm i’s proﬁt is given by
Πi = pixi + qiyi
Since the two markets are independent, except for possible forbearance ef-












for i = 1,2.
Due to our parameter restrictions all equilibrium sales are positive. Fur-
thermore, all equilibrium prices, i.e. unit proﬁts, are positive. For c > 0, re-
spectively γ > 0, the X-, respectively Y -products of both ﬁrms are strategic
complements. To get a clue what cooperation, predicted by the forbearance
hypothesis, requires, we have also derived the choices which maximise the











for i = 1,2
with the individual proﬁts
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for i = 1,2.
The parameters used in the experiment are shown in table 1. Since proﬁts
Table 1 Parameters used in the experiment
a,α b,β c,γ x∗ x+ Π∗ Π+
substitutes 64 2 -4 8 5 128 170
complements 24 2 1 8 12 128 144
Since participants choose only integer quantities in the experiment, x+ = 5 for markets
with substitutes, and not 5 1/3.
with cooperation are substantially higher, we expect that participants will
try to maintain cooperation with their partner.
Hypothesis 1 The majority of the subjects will sell more than the equilibrium
quantity with complements and less with substitutes.
According to the forbearance hypothesis, two ﬁrms which compete against
each other on two unrelated markets will behave less aggressively than they
would do if they were only active in one market. They fear that an aggres-
sive strategy against their competitor in one market will not only translate
into a competition in this market, but might also eﬀect their sales in the
other market, e.g. when their competitor takes revenge and responds with a
quantity competition in the other market. This could lead to a loss that is
bigger than the gain in the ﬁrst market. Therefore, we suppose that we will
ﬁnd more cooperation in markets where conglomerate ﬁrms compete against
each other.
Hypothesis 2 We will ﬁnd more cooperation in markets with conglomerate
ﬁrms than in markets with single ﬁrms.
In our partner design with twelve repeated rounds the players have more time
to ﬁnd out how their partner acts than in our random stranger design with
only four rounds with the same partner. That way they are more likely to
come to a cooperative solution. In addition, taking a choice which yields low
proﬁts for the partner can be punished for a longer time by the opponent in
the partner matching. Knowing this, we suspect subjects to be more prudent
of their choice and thus to cooperate more in the treatments with a partner
matching.
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sign (rematching every 12 periods) than in treatments where rematching oc-
curs every 4 periods.
As already mentioned above, we suspect that ﬁrms act less aggressively when
they are active in two markets than when they are active in one market, be-
cause they fear revenge for their decisions. For the above mentioned reasons,
this eﬀect should be stronger in treatments where players face the same op-
ponent in two markets simultaneously (homogenous conglomerates) than in
treatments where players act in two markets, but with diﬀerent opponents
(heterogenous conglomerates), because in the latter they cannot be punished
in the second market for their behavior in the ﬁrst market. Thus, we expect
more cooperation in treatments where players interact with the same player
in both markets, namely in homogenous conglomerates.
Hypothesis 4 Homogeneous conglomerates behave less aggressively than het-
erogeneous conglomerates.
Competition can have qualitatively diﬀerent eﬀects when products are com-
plements rather than substitutes (Bester and G¨ uth, 1998). In complement
markets the incentives are more aligned than in substitute markets what
suggests hypothesis 5.
Hypothesis 5 There will be more cooperation in complement markets than in
substitute markets.
3 Experimental design
The symmetry of both markets allows us to use just one payoﬀ table per mar-
ket (see the instructions for the treatments with the same two conglomerate
ﬁrms and the partners matching in the appendix. The other instructions
diﬀer from these only where necessary). We have consistently avoided sym-
metry of parameters across markets by (a,b,c)  = (α,β,γ), but have chosen
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market would imply
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Period 2 remaining time [sec]: 57
Market X Market Y






















1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
1 58 54 50 46 42 38 34 30 26 22 18 14
2 112 104 96 88 80 72 64 56 48 40 32 24
3 162 150 138 126 114 102 90 78 66 54 42 30
4 208 192 176 160 144 128 112 96 80 64 48 32
5 250 230 210 190 170 150 130 110 90 70 50 30
6 288 264 240 216 192 168 144 120 96 72 48 24
7 322 294 266 238 210 182 154 126 98 70 42 14
8 352 320 288 256 224 192 160 128 96 64 32 0
9 378 342 306 270 234 198 162 126 90 54 18 -18
10 400 360 320 280 240 200 160 120 80 40 0 -40
11 418 374 330 286 242 198 154 110 66 22 -22 -66
12 432 384 336 288 240 192 144 96 48 0 -48 -96






















4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
4 80 84 88 92 96 100 104 108 112 116 120 124
5 90 95 100 105 110 115 120 125 130 135 140 145
6 96 102 108 114 120 126 132 138 144 150 156 162
7 98 105 112 119 126 133 140 147 154 161 168 175
8 96 104 112 120 128 136 144 152 160 168 176 184
9 90 99 108 117 126 135 144 153 162 171 180 189
10 80 90 100 110 120 130 140 150 160 170 180 190
11 66 77 88 99 110 121 132 143 154 165 176 187
12 48 60 72 84 96 108 120 132 144 156 168 180
13 26 39 52 65 78 91 104 117 130 143 156 169
14 0 14 28 42 56 70 84 98 112 126 140 154
15 -30 -15 0 15 30 45 60 75 90 105 120 135
OK
In the experiment participants click for each market on a row for their own sales quantity
and on a column to indicate what they think their partner’s choice will be. Chosen rows
and columns are highlighted in red. The intersection of a highlighted row and column is
marked with a circle. Feedback (regarding the other player’s actual quantity and the own
proﬁt) is only given after both participants have entered their choices. Knowing the two
quantities players can also look up the other player’s proﬁt in the table.
i.e. c must have the same sign as γ, meaning that both markets must feature
either substitutes or complements. Since we want to include the situation
where one market is for substitutes and one for complements we have to
accept that cartel proﬁts can not always be the same.
Asymmetric attractiveness of the two markets—will forbearance mainly
pacify the better market in the sense of higher equilibrium proﬁts?—could
be an interesting topic of future research. Here it has been neglected to limit
the anyhow unusually large number of treatments. Due to the asymmet-
ric parameters across markets, participants may not be aware that markets
are equally attractive from a rational choice perspective and may actually
experience them as yielding diﬀerent proﬁts.
Forbearance, if it can be detected, e.g. by higher than equilibrium proﬁts
or by higher proﬁts than in the control treatment with one-market ﬁrms, may
be strong initially and lose importance later or vice versa. It therefore seems
important to repeat the experiment often enough to render such dynamics
observable. In the partners design the two ﬁrms, represented by two partic-
ipants, stay together over twelve rounds. After that they are matched with
a new partner with whom they play the next twelve rounds. The repetition
is not previously announced. But when starting the repetition, participants
are told that after the repetition the experiment ends. The details of the
experimental setup are described in appendix A.
The experiment was programmed and conducted with the software z-Tree
(Fischbacher, 2007) using the online recruitment system ORSEE (Greiner,
7
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nomics at the University of Jena between July 2008 and July 2009. All in all
we collected 139 independent observations involving 574 participants.
An overview of the diﬀerent treatments is provided in table 2. Our ex-
periment was preceded by a language test to ensure that everyone was able
to understand the instructions. After the instructions were read and ques-
tions were answered in private participants ﬁlled out a comprehension test
to ensure that they understand the experiment. After the experiment was
ﬁnished they completed a post-experimental questionnaire eliciting, among
others, the sales strategy used.
In the experiment subjects do not have to calculate their payoﬀ with the
help of the demand function. They get—depending on the treatment which
determines whether they are active on one or two markets—one or two tables,
respectively, with which they can choose their sales amount (between 1 and 12
and between 4 and 15 in substitute and complement markets, respectively).
They also have to predict what their partner (i.e. their rival on the respective
market) is going to choose. A typical decision and feedback screen used in the
experiment is shown in ﬁgure 1. Both players decide simultaneously. After
each round both players receive feedback about both choices and their payoﬀ
in this round. Earnings are cumulated over all 24 rounds and paid in cash
after the experiment using an exchange rate of 250 ECU/Euro if active in one
market and an exchange rate of 500 ECU/Euro if active in two markets. The
earning per person was between 7.8 Euros and 18.6 Euros with an average
of 12.49 Euros. Sessions usually lasted about 90 minutes.
Our design diﬀers from that of Feinberg and Sherman (1985) and Phillips
and Mason (1992) who performed pen-and-paper classroom sessions. Al-
though one can easily infer other’s proﬁts from the own feedback information
after a round, unlike Feinberg and Sherman (1985) we did not provide this
information to avoid demand eﬀects like inspiring payoﬀ comparisons or imi-
tation learning and other regarding concerns. Furthermore, whereas Feinberg
and Sherman (1985) explore their treatments within subjects we employed a
between subjects design throughout.
4 Results
Participants played for 24 periods. Figure 2 shows frequencies of pairs of
choices for all markets and for all markets with complements. The size (area)
of the circles is proportional to the frequency. The equilibrium is denoted
by N, the symmetric cooperative outcome is denoted by C, the asymmetric
8






















































































































1 no conglomerate (a) 12 substitutes 8 32
2 no conglomerate (a) 12 complements 8 32
3 no conglomerate (a) 4 substitutes 11 44
4 no conglomerate (a) 4 complements 8 32
5 homogeneous (b) 12 substitutes substitutes 12 48
6 homogeneous (b) 12 substitutes complements 12 48
7 homogeneous (b) 12 complements complements 11 44
8 homogeneous (b) 4 substitutes substitutes 12 48
9 homogeneous (b) 4 substitutes complements 12 48
10 homogeneous (b) 4 complements complements 12 48
11 heterogeneous (c) 12 substitutes complements 12 48
12 heterogeneous (c) 4 substitutes complements 12 48
13 asymmetric (d) 12 substitutes complements 9 54
The matching structure is described in detail in appendix A.
cooperative outcome in markets for substitutes is denoted by X. Figures 3
and 4 provide more details for the individual treatments. Each graph shows
the diﬀerence between the relative frequency of choices in a treatment (for
a given market type, either substitutes or complements) and the average
of this market type (substititutes or complements). While the ﬁgures help
us to better understand some of the eﬀects, we will present mixed eﬀects
regressions to measure these eﬀects in a more systematic way.
The average proﬁt for each market per round was between -96 and 432
with an average of 129.6 ECU, slightly above the proﬁt of the equilibrium
level of 128. Figure 5 shows the development of average proﬁts during the
experiment. We see a clear end-game eﬀect, i.e. a decrease in proﬁts in the
last round of every matching sequence. Figure 6 shows boxplots of proﬁts for
the diﬀerent treatments and markets indicating that the variance of proﬁts
is much smaller in markets for complements. We also see that proﬁts in
conglomerates are more heterogeneous than in our baseline treatments.
The left part of ﬁgure 7 illustrates the distribution of quantities sepa-
rately for substitutes and for complements. In line with hypothesis 1 most
quantities (67.71%) are strictly larger than the equilibrium quantity of 8 for
9
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The size (area) of the symbols is proportional frequencies of choices.
Figure 3 Frequencies of pairs of choices compared to average — substitutes



























































C − sym. coop.
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X − asym. coop






































































The size (area) of the symbols is proportional to the relative frequencies of choices in
the treatment minus the relative frequency of choices in all treatments with markets for
substitutes. Numbers of treatments correspond to table 2.
complements. This property is less pronounced for substitutes. According
to hypothesis 1 we should ﬁnd a smaller than equilibrium quantity for sub-
stitutes if players, indeed, cooperate also when products are substitutes. A
much smaller proportion of players (43.3%) chooses quantities strictly smaller
than the Nash equilibrium when products are substitutes. We will come back
to this observation in the discussion of equations (5) and (7) below.
10
Jena Economic Research Papers 2010 - 043Figure 4 Frequencies of pairs of choices compared to average — complement



















































































































The size (area) of the symbols is proportional to the relative frequencies of choices in
the treatment minus the relative frequency of choices in all treatments with markets for
complements. Numbers of treatments correspond to table 2.
Figure 5 Proﬁts over time


































Result 1 While most participants clearly choose more than equilibrium (co-
operative) quantities with complements, a much smaller fraction chooses less
than equilibrium (cooperative) quantities with substitutes.
To conﬁrm the above results with the help of an econometric model, we will
deﬁne two variables:
Cooperation rate We will say that subjects cooperate fully if they choose the
symmetric cooperative solution. We should keep in mind that for substitutes
joint proﬁt is maximised when one player stays out of the market and the
11
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Figure 7 Substitutes and complements: quantity, cooperation, inequality





































































































other produces everything. To measure diﬀerent degrees of cooperation we




Π(xi,xj) + Π(xj,xi) − 2   Π∗
2   (Π+ − Π∗)
￿
(1)
Π(xi,xj) + Π(xj,xi) is the joint proﬁt of both players, Π∗ the equilibrium
proﬁt of a single player, and Π+ is the proﬁt of a single player in the symmetric
cooperative outcome.
By deﬁnition, r+ = 1 in the symmetric cooperative outcome and r+ = 0
in the Nash-equilibrium. In complement markets r+ > 0 requires that a
players chooses a quantity higher than the equilibrium quantity of 8, while
12
Jena Economic Research Papers 2010 - 043Figure 8 Conglomerates and single ﬁrms: cooperation and inequality






































































in substitute markets r+ requires a quantity lower than 8. The middle part
of Figure 7 shows the distribution of the relative cooperation rate r+.
Result 2 In the majority (i.e. 76.7%) of cases the relative cooperation rate is
positive (r+ ≥ 0).















We suspect that ﬁrms which compete against each other on two unrelated
markets behave less aggressively when making their sales choices, because
they fear the eﬀects this might have for the proﬁt on their other market.
The partner they are playing with might take revenge on the other mar-
ket and choose amounts of goods which lower the proﬁts of the other ﬁrm
dramatically.
To have a more formal look at hypotheses 2 to 5 we estimate two mixed
eﬀects model for relative cooperation r+. We ﬁrst deﬁne X as
X ≡ β0 + βpartner   dpartner + βsubs   dsubs + βhomcon   dhomcon+
βhetcon   dhetcon + βasymcon   dasymcon . (3)
dpartner is a dummy that is 1 with partner matching (rematching every twelve
periods) and zero otherwise, dsubs is a dummy that is 1 in substitute mar-
kets and zero otherwise, dhomcon is 1 in homogeneous conglomerates and zero
otherwise, dhetcon is 1 in heterogeneous conglomerates, and dasymcon is 1 in
asymmetric conglomerates. We also deﬁne Z as
Z ≡ β0 + βpartner   dpartner + βsubs   dsubs + βconglSubs   dconglSubs+
βconglSubs   dconglSubs + βconglSubsMix   dconglSubsMix+
βconglSubsMix   dconglSubsMix + βhetcon   dhetcon + βasymcon   dasymcon . (4)
13
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eq. (5) eq. (6)
(Intercept) 0.414∗∗∗ [0.314;0.514] 0.457∗∗∗ [0.354;0.560]
partner 0.083∗ [−0.006;0.173] 0.056 [−0.031;0.143]










Stars denote the following signiﬁcance levels: ***=.001, **=.01, *=.05. 95% conﬁdence
intervals are given in brackets.
dconglSubs is 1 for substitute conglomerates when both markets are substi-
tutes, dconglSubs is 1 for complement conglomerates when both markets are
complements, dconglSubsMix is 1 for substititute conglomerates when the other
market is diﬀerent (i.e. for complements), and dconglSubsMix is 1 for comple-
ment conglomerates when the other market is diﬀerent. We also estimated
speciﬁcations with time and interactions between time and conglomerate but
found that time does not play a signiﬁcant role here.
We now compare the following two speciﬁcations:
r
+
it = X + ǫg + ǫit (5)
r
+
it = Z + ǫg + ǫit (6)
where g is an index of the independent observation, i is an index for the
individual participant and t indicates the period. In a similar way we also
explain proﬁts via
Πit = X + ǫg + ǫit (7)
Πit = Z + ǫg + ǫit (8)
To exclude end game behaviour we drop the last period of each interaction.
Estimation results are shown in tables 3 and 4. In contrast to our expec-
tations we do not ﬁnd a positive but, for all three types of conglomerates, a
strong negative eﬀect in equations (5) and (7). When we look more closely
at the type of the market in equations (6) and (8) we ﬁnd a negative eﬀect in
14
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eq. (7) eq. (8)
(Intercept) 136.78∗∗∗ [132.69;140.86] 135.54∗∗∗ [131.19;139.88]
partner 3.25∗ [−0.19;6.70] 2.22 [−1.04;5.49]










Stars denote the following signiﬁcance levels: ***=.001, **=.01, *=.05. 95% conﬁdence
intervals are given in brackets.
three out of four cases. Only for a symmetric market with substitutes we ﬁnd
a signiﬁcant increase in cooperation and an (although insigniﬁcant) increase
in proﬁts. For the other three cases, i.e. mixed conglomerates and symmet-
ric conglomerates with markets for complements cooperation and proﬁts are
smaller in conglomerates than in non-conglomerates.
Result 3 Conglomerate ﬁrms cooperate less than ﬁrms only active in one
market.
How to explain such surprising results will be discussed in the concluding
section.
We do, however, ﬁnd support for hypothesis 3. The coeﬃcient βpartner is
positive and signiﬁcant in equation (5) and also positive and weakly signiﬁ-
cant in equation (7).
Result 4 There is more cooperation in treatments with partner design (match-
ing for twelve periods) than in treatments with more frequent rematching (ev-
ery four periods).
While we had to reject hypothesis 2, we ﬁnd at least weak support for hy-
pothesis 4. The coeﬃcient βhomcon is positive, but only weakly signiﬁcant in
equation (5) and not signiﬁcant in equation (7).
Result 5 There is little, but only weakly signiﬁcantly more cooperation in
homogeneous conglomerates.
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Jena Economic Research Papers 2010 - 043Table 5 Determinants of the inequality: estimation results for equations (9)
and (10)
eq. (9) eq. (10)
(Intercept) 0.012 [−0.006;0.030] 0.002 [−0.017;0.021]
partner −0.006 [−0.023;0.010] −0.000 [−0.017;0.017]










Stars denote the following signiﬁcance levels: ***=.001, **=.01, *=.05. 95% conﬁdence
intervals are given in brackets.
The most signiﬁcant and strongest eﬀect we ﬁnd is that of dsubs which
supports hypothesis 5. This coeﬃcient is highly signiﬁcant in equation (5)
and in equation (7).
Result 6 There is more cooperation and higher proﬁts in markets for com-
plements than in markets for substitutes.
Inequality To assess inequality in the diﬀerent treatments we estimate the
following equation where we use the measure of inequality iit as deﬁned in
equation (2). Again we compare two speciﬁcations:
iit = β0 + X + ǫg + ǫit (9)
iit = β0 + Z + ǫg + ǫit (10)
Results are shown in table 5. As we could already see in ﬁgure 2, asymmet-
ric outcomes occur predominantly in substitute markets. In conglomerates
inequality is slightly higher, but the eﬀect is much smaller compared to the
eﬀect of substitutes.
5 Conclusions
To test the forbearance hypothesis, we performed a very systematic experi-
mental analysis by allowing for diﬀerentiated products in the form of strategic
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rematching, and running several control treatments with diﬀerent conglom-
erates or single product ﬁrms as well as with markets with no conglomerates
at all.
Before summarising our own ﬁndings let us brieﬂy view the major ﬁnd-
ings of the experimental investigations of forbearance eﬀects by Feinberg and
Sherman (1985) whose experimental setup has been described in section 3
and whose theoretical analysis is based on a conjectural variation approach.
Feinberg and Sherman (1985) only consider homogeneous markets so that
they can measure competitiveness by the sum of sales amounts. They ob-
served no treatment eﬀects (same rivals versus diﬀerent conglomerate rivals
on the two markets) regarding the total output on either market, but signiﬁ-
cant variance eﬀects, namely a larger variance for the same than for diﬀerent
conglomerate rivals as well as for experienced than for inexperienced partic-
ipants.
In our experiment participants mostly behave more cooperatively than
the predicted equilibrium benchmark. As expected, we ﬁnd more cooper-
ation in complement than in substitute markets, more cooperation in in-
frequent rematching than in the frequent matching, and also—only weakly
signiﬁcantly—more cooperation in homogeneous than in heterogeneous con-
glomerates.
Surprisingly, conglomerate ﬁrms cooperate signiﬁcantly less than single
ﬁrms. Thus, at least in our experiment conglomerates do not have anti-
competitive eﬀects. Actually, conglomerates seem to enhance competition.
A possible explanation of this astonishing result could be a multi-market
analogue of leapfrogging, i.e., of strong competitive attempts by those lagging
behind, for instance, in market or innovative success (for an experimental
study of the latter, see, for instance, Cantner et al., 2009). If one ﬁrm is
less successful on one market, this ﬁrm might be induced to “win” the other
market. If anticipated by the competitor, both ﬁrms could be inspired to
behave more competitively.
Of course, such behaviour can more easily evolve over time. In our exper-
iment, it could unfold when one conglomerate is dominating one market—in
the sense that market results would be disastrous when the other ﬁrm sells the
same amount as the dominating ﬁrm. If on the other market both conglom-
erates sell similar amounts, the disadvantaged ﬁrm might try to dominate the
other market. Thus, any strong disparity on one market can easily initiate a
process of alternating attempts to dominate at least one market and of lower
than equilibrium proﬁts.
Our study shows that identifying anti-competitive eﬀects by multimarket
ﬁrms require complex explanatory variables because ﬁrms have become more
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internal organisation between the headquarter and their subsidiaries as well
as between factor and product markets. Thus, in ﬁrms with weak internal
coordination the headquarter cannot pose credible threats of retaliation to
aggressive moves made by global multimarket ﬁrms against its subsidiaries.
And, as Markman et al. (2009) have shown, forbearance in product markets
may happen even at high costs to maintain forbearance in factor markets.
Consequently, experiments, like ours, are able to test the mutual forbearance
hypothesis from multimarket contact in a complex imperfectly observable
context of a global market environment.
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A Experimental Setup
We have relied on matching groups with four participants each in all treat-
ments except for treatment 13 where conglomerate ﬁrms interact with single
ﬁrms on the same markets. There we have matching groups of six.
Baseline treatment — no conglomerates: In our baseline treatment there
are no conglomerates. The strategic interaction takes place only on a single
market. If we write markets X and Y next to connections between the four
members of a matching group, then matching in the baseline treatments












Jena Economic Research Papers 2010 - 043We study the case of no conglomerates both in a partners and in a strangers
setting. In the partners setting we ﬁrst play a game with one of these match-
ings for the ﬁrst 12 rounds. Then another game is announced, again for 12
rounds, where we use another of the above matchings.
In the random matching setting we switch among the above matchings
every four rounds. After 12 rounds another game is announced, again for 12
rounds, where again every four rounds the matching is changed.
Participants are not aware of the small size of the matching group. All
what they know is that pairs are randomly formed in every four or in every
twelve rounds. We start a new game after 12 rounds both in the partners
and in the random matching treatment to avoid as far as possible any biases
between the partners and the strangers design. We run the baseline treatment
both with substitutes and with complements (treatments 1-4).
Homogeneous conglomerates: In the homogeneous conglomerate treatment
(treatments 5-10), two ﬁrms simultaneously interact on two markets, using











Heterogeneous conglomerates: When conglomerates are supposed to com-
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x x y y [c]
This setup is again studied in a partners design, where participants are ﬁrst
matched for 12 rounds, and then, following a diﬀerent matching from [c], are
rematched for another 12 rounds (treatment 11). In the random matching de-
sign we rematch every four rounds, with a restart after 12 rounds (treatment
12).
In the random strangers design the one missing of the other three par-
ticipants was randomly changing between rounds. Furthermore, one could
encounter the two partners on the X- or the Y -market in an irregular fashion.
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erates are supposed to compete with non-conglomerates, each matching group
of six participants contained two conglomerates and four“one market-ﬁrms”,
one for the X-market and one for the Y -market for each conglomerate ﬁrm.
Here we only ran a partners design with two sessions containing 3 matching


















A (random) strangers design would have required larger matching groups
what might have questioned the comparability of the results across treat-
ments.
Substitutes and complements: Interaction on the above markets might de-
pend on whether products are substitutes or complements. For the baseline
treatment [a] without conglomerates (treatments 1-4) and the homogeneous
conglomerates (treatments 5-10) we study all possible combinations. The
case of heterogeneous conglomerates (treatments 11 and 12, [c]) and the case
of conglomerates and single ﬁrms (treatment 13, [d]) is only studied in one
setting each: products on the X-market are substitutes, products on the
Y -market are complements (again, see table 2).
B Experimental Instructions
Here we present the translation of the originally German instructions for
treatment 6 (partner design, homogeneous conglomerates, substitute and com-
plement markets). The instructions for the other treatments diﬀer only where
necessary.
Welcome to this experiment and thank you for participating!
You can earn money in this experiment; the amount will depend on your
own decisions and on the decisions of the other participants. Therefore, it is
very important that you read these instructions carefully.
If you have any questions, please raise your hand. We will get to your
seat and answer your questions. Please do not ask your questions out loudly.
All participants of this experiment get the same instructions, whereas the
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information that appears on the computer screen during the game is for the
respective participant only. That is why you are not allowed to look at the
screens of the other participants or to talk to them during the experiment.
Non-compliance with these rules will result in your exclusion from the exper-
iment. Please switch oﬀ your mobile phones now.
In the following experiment you will play together with one partner. You
and your partner each represent two ﬁrms. These ﬁrms are active in the same
markets, namely market X and market Y. Your task is to determine the sales
volume of your ﬁrms in these markets. Your partner’s task is to determine
the sales volume of his/her ﬁrms in the same markets. Each of his/her ﬁrms













You will play the following twelve rounds with the same partner.
During the experiment you will see charts on the screen. In these charts
you can see how your decision and the decision of the other ﬁrm inﬂuence
your proﬁt and the proﬁt of the other ﬁrm on the considered market.
The rows of the chart show your sales volume, it can be seen from the
left margin. The sales volume of the other ﬁrm is shown in the columns.
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The number in each cell of the chart shows how much you would earn in
this round if you choose the amount indicated by the row of this cell and the
other ﬁrm chooses the amount indicated by this column.
The proﬁt of your partner’s ﬁrm in this market can be determined with
the same chart. If you want to know how much the other ﬁrm will earn, all
you have to do is invert the lines and rows of the chart, i. e. in this case
your sales volume can be seen in the columns and the sales volume of your
partner is shown in the rows. The intersection cell shows the earnings of your
partner’s ﬁrm. This might help you in ﬁnding out which amount the other
ﬁrm might choose. However, you cannot inﬂuence the sales volume taken by
the other ﬁrm. Nevertheless, it is important for your own decision to have a
precise assumption about how the other ﬁrm will act.
To help you with your considerations you can click the sales volume you
expect the other ﬁrm to choose in the top row and the sales volume you want
to choose yourself on the left margin. The corresponding row and column
will be indicated in red. The proﬁt you will earn in this market in this round
if your partner indeed acts as you guess will be circled. You can try several
combinations if you want to. Please conﬁrm your ﬁnal decision by clicking
the OK button. The payoﬀ of one market in a round depends on the sales
amount chosen by you and the sales amount chosen by the other ﬁrm.
To help you to keep track you can ﬁnd a table at your seat into which
you can ﬁll in your sales volume, your partner’s sales volume, and your proﬁt
after each round.
The proﬁts in the charts are given in ECU (experimental currency units).
You will be informed about the exchange rate of ECU into Euro on your
computer screen at the beginning of the experiment. This exchange rate is
the same for all participants. At the end of the experiment you will be paid
the sum of your proﬁts from all rounds in Euro. This amount will be paid
to you privately. No other participant will learn from us how much you have
earned.
Once you have read the instructions carefully, please start answering the
questions on the computer screen. There will be one question at once on
the screen. These questions check your understanding of the experiment.
Unfortunately, you will only be allowed to take part in the experiment if you
understood the rules. If you make too many mistakes in the questionnaire
you cannot participate. If you are not sure how to answer a question, you
may read the instructions again, of course.
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